As previously discussed, the Tactical Decision Making Under Stress (TADMUS) program was designed to (a) define the decision problem facing Navy tactical teams, (b) develop measures of tactical decision making (TDM) performance, (c) collect empirical data to document the impact of stress on TDM, and (d) develop and test principles for decision support, information display, training system design, and simulation that would mitigate these stress effects. Given the complexity of the environment (see Collyer & Malecki, chap. 1, this volume), the project team was presented with a formidable challenge: how to weed through the universe of things that we could do to improve performance and select only those interventions that would yield the most significant gains. We were motivated both practically and scientifically to answer this question. On the practical side, it was clear that a program afforded the resources and visibility of TADMUS needed to provide some demonstrable results fairly quickly. More important, we were committed from the outset to develop and test interventions that would actually be implemented in operational settings -we did not have the time or money to suffer many failures. From the scientific side, we were determined to make best use of what we considered to be a tremendous opportunity-the mandate and resources to study a difficult, real-world problem in depth. This was a n opportunity that does not present itself very often.
ing this, we describe the major theoretical perspectives we adopted for the program. Finally, we summarize the major hypotheses associated with these theories and describe briefly the training interventions that were developed from them.
Boundaries of the Problem
To select theoretical perspectives appropriate for the problem with which we were dealing, it was necessary to establish the boundaries of the problem and delineate important definitions. In the following sections, we provide a description of the decision environment and task, the nature of stressors characteristic of the environment, and major definitions.
Defining the Decision Environment
Demands on the human decision maker in military tactical environments are becoming more complicated with advances in technology and changes in the world order. Modern combat scenarios are often characterized by rapidly evolving and changing conditions, severe time compression, and high degrees of ambiguity and uncertainty. In addition, such situations often present the decision maker with a n overwhelming amount of data and require the coordinated performance of a team of operators who must gather, process, integrate, communicate, and act on these data in support of a tactical decision. A variety of other stressors (both physical and psychological) also exist in the operational setting, not the least of which is the catastrophic costs of making an error, which mitigate against effective individual and group performance. Coupled with the fact that the modern military scenario is likely to be complex and multinational, these factors have provided unprecedented demands on the human decision maker.
An example may help to illustrate this contention (see Johnston, Poirer, chap. 3, this volume, for details) . One of the tasks facing a team of operators in a Navy combat information center (CIC) is to defend the ship against hostile aircraft. This task is accomplished by a hierarchically structured team of operators/decision makers, with final decision authority retained by a single individual. Team members perform a variety of functions in support of the final decision: They operate sensor consoles to detect aircraft, integrate information collected regarding the aircraft's intent, make decisions about how and when to seek additional information, and make decisions about how and when to transmit pertinent situation assessment information. Once information is passed to a final decision maker, it must be considered against the situational constraints (e.g., rules of engagement) and potential consequences before a decision can be reached or action taken.
To function in such a situation, team members must understand the system at several levels. First, they must understand the dynamics and control of the equipment (both hardware and software) with which they are interacting to extract information. Second, they must understand the demands of the task and how to accomplish them (e.g., the significance of information, types of information required, strategies to combine information, necessary procedures, etc.). They must also understand how various facets of the environment affect the task and task demands (e.g., when workload increases as a function of air traffic in the area, or when radar reception is affected by weather conditions). Third, they must understand sound decision-making process so that they optimize the use of available information and avoid errors. Fourth, they must understand their role in the task, that is, what their particular contribution is, how they must interact with other team members, who requires particular classes of information, and so forth.
Finally, to perform optimally, tactical team members must be familiar with the knowledge, skills, attitudes, preferences, and other task-relevant attributes of their teammates. This is because expectations for the behavior of their teammates will vary as a function of the individuals who comprise the team. When working with a particularly competent teammate, for example, a team member may alter his or her behavior so that it is consistent with how he or she thinks that teammate will perform.
Defining Stressors in the Environment
There are many definitions of stress in the literature (e.g., Hogan & Hogan, 1982; Ivancevich & Matteson, 1980; Janis & Mann, 1977) . For our purposes, we adopted the definition of stress offered by Salas, Driskell, and Hughes (1996) as "a process by which certain environmental demands . . . evoke an appraisal process in which perceived demand exceeds resources and results in undesirable physiological, psychological, behavioral, or social outcomes" (p. 6). Practically, our initial investigations involved extensive interviewing and observing of actual Navy crews. As a function of this effort, we found that the following characteristics, which can be defined as stressors, all appear to be present in the operational environment: A second benefit of these interviews and observations was to determine which stressors are likely to have a n impact on decision-making per-formance. Of these, it was necessary to select a subset of stressors that could be induced reliably and safely in experiments. It was decided that the following stressors were candidates for manipulation in experimental studies.
Task-related stressors workloadhime pressure 0 uncertainty/ambiguity 0 auditory overload Ambient stressors auditory interference performance pressure 0 fatigudsustained operations Once potential stressors for manipulation were identified, a survey of the literature was conducted to determine the most common ways these stressors have been manipulated in past research. Manipulation techniques were assessed on the basis of reliability with which stress could be created, the face validity of the procedure, ethical concerns, safety, and feasibility. On the basis of this review and interaction with fleet personnel, the following initial stress manipulations were established.
Workloadtime pressure. Workload and time pressure were manipulated using the tactical task (problem) scenario. Specifically, the number of tasks an operator performed simultaneously was increased as a manipulation of workload. Time pressure was defined as the time allowed to process a radar contact, and manipulated by changing the distance at which a potentially hostile contact was inserted into the scenario (ie., the closer the contact was to own ship on initial detection, the less time the team had to prosecute it). Uncertaintylambiguity. Uncertainty was described as the amount of information available regarding a contact's intent. Under high uncertainty conditions less information was available, as, for example, when an identification mode was not available on a contact. Auditory overload. Auditory overload refers to an overload of information being received through auditory channels. In actual CICs, operators are required to monitor several channels of auditory information simultaneously (both intraship and external communications) to receive information that is crucial to their task. Auditory overload was manipulated by creating scenario-specific tapes that could be fed into operator headsets during an exercise. Tapes included information that was pertinent to the task and scenario events.
Other Issues
There are a number of other decisions that we made early regarding the boundaries of the problem. The first is that a major portion of the effort would be devoted toward investigating and improving team performance. The importance of understanding team-level issues has been well documented (Guzzo & Salas, 1995; Hackman, 1990) . In this particular case, it was clear that we were dealing with a team task according to the definition offered by Salas, Dickinson, Tannenbaum, and Converse (1992) . That is, we were dealing with more than two individuals who held a shared, valued goal and who were interdependent (i.e., successful task completion depended on the coordination of multiple operators). Obviously, the decision to focus on team performance and training issues had a significant impact on the project; the extent of this impact is made apparent in the remainder of this chapter and others in this volume (see chaps. 8-10 and 12).
A second focus of the program was primarily on scenario or exercisebased training. By this we mean that we were interested in training interventions that were experiential-wherein trainees received some measure of hands-on practice on the task. This is not to say that other types of interventions (e.g., lecture based) were excluded from consideration, only that we emphasized scenario-based training. Our reasoning here was that first we were more interested in training advanced skills-teamwork and decision making-that would require a training strategy that allowed trainees to gain experience and receive feedback on task performance. In addition, we were most interested in developing training for application to deployed (shipboard) contexts; these were less conducive to "classroomstyle" training than scenario-based training. Finally, although scenariobased training has application to a wide variety of tasks, we did not find much in the research literature to guide its development.
Selecting Theoretical Perspectives
As noted, we had a difficult challenge at the outset of the program-that is, to select particular training approaches that would yield the greatest gains in performance. To begin to cope with this challenge, we initially decided that there were three broad categories of interventions that we believed would be effective.
1. Increase overall performance readiness (i.e., knowledge and skill levels): We reasoned that individuals and teams highly competent in executing a task will be more resilient to the negative effects of stress on performance. Therefore, a goal of TADMUS was to improve methods to train tactical decision making in teams and individuals so that the likelihood of reaching task proficiency is enhanced and the amount of time required to reach proficiency is reduced.
2. Training stress coping skills: We reasoned that a class of training interventions would be geared toward training operators to cope with the stressors that confronted them in the task environment. For example, sev-era1 theorists have suggested that exposing trainees to stress in training can inoculate them from the impact of stress in the actual task performance situation (e.g., Novaco, Cook, & Sarason, 1983; Sarason, Johnson, Berberich, & Siegel, 1979) . Methods to implement stress exposure techniques in a tactical decision-making environment were investigated in TADMUS (e.g., see .
3. Target individual and teamwork skills that are particularly vulnerable to the effects of stress: On the basis of results from baseline studies, we believed it possible to identify skills that are particularly vulnerable to the effects of stress. An effort was made to concentrate attention on these skills in training so as to reduce the impact of stress on tactical decision-making performance. For example, we know that the ability to communicate is affected by stress (e.g., Kleinman & Serfaty, 1989 ); hence we focused effort specifically on training communication skills.
With these three categories of intervention in mind, we were still left with the task of selecting theories that would guide the research. Initially, we looked toward the learning and instructional literature for possible answers. However, it quickly became apparent that this class of theories provided a very small portion of the solution. This is because instructional theories have a tendency to focus on what Salas and Cannon-Bowers (1997) refer to as the methods of training, that is, how to train. Some of these go as far as linking training task characteristics to specific training methods. Further, they describe the process of skill acquisition, that is, how people learn and generalize new knowledge and skills. What they do not do is provide information regarding the content of training. To understand this, more general theories of human performance are required.
Given what has been said thus far, we selected a number of theoretical perspectives that involve the manner in which individuals and teams perform and learn complex decision-making skills. We further divided these into what we consider "major" influences-those perspectives that pervaded our thinking across many training interventions, and less pervasive influences-those that had a more limited impact. Specifically, major theoretical perspectives include naturalistic decision making, team performance and effectiveness, and shared mental models.
All of these were adopted because they had something important to say about how individuals and teams cope with the demands and difficulties of a task. Essentially, each of these theoretical perspectives describe how people perform-how they gather and use information, how they perceive the task situation, how they interact with their teammates, and how they adjust their strategies in accordance with task demands. As such, they delineate "expert" performance and can provide a target for training. In particular, naturalistic decision making describes how people make complex, real-world decisions; team performance and effectiveness theories describe how expert teams perform and the requisite competencies needed for such performance-they begin to help us answer the question of how to turn a team of experts into an expert team; and shared mental model theory helps to explain how teams can be adaptable and flexible in response to stressors. Taken together, these perspectives cover the range of performance that we needed to train; each is described in more detail in later sections.
The more minor (but very important) theoretical perspectives we selected include automaticity, goal orientation, meta-cognition, and stress inoculation.
These perspectives all offer insight into how people perform and learn in the targeted environments. First, automaticity theory describes how overlearning of particular aspects of the task can benefit overall task performance. Meta-cogntion theory (which is associated with naturalistic decision making in some senses) explains how the meta-cognitive process can benefit both learning and performance of complex decision making. Goal orientation holds that attention can be focused on various outcomes in training and predicts that an emphasis on mastery of the task is superior to an emphasis on maximizing performance outcomes. Finally, borrowing heavily from the clinical psychology literature, stress inoculation suggests that people can be taught systematically to cope with the stressors likely to confront them in the operational environment. These perspectives are explained in more detail in the following sections.
It is clear that there are other important theoretical perspectives that we could have selected to guide our work. However, as a result of an extensive investigation of the operational problem and thorough review of the literature, we selected this subset because it covers the major aspects of learning and performance that we felt were most crucial. The next section provides more detail on these perspectives.
Major Theoretical Perspectives
At this point we can describe the theoretical perspectives associated with TADMUS. To do so, we first describe the theory itself and how it relates to the performance of interest. We then list briefly the implications of the theory for training-that is, what the theory might suggest by way of training design.
Naturalistic Decision Making
For many years, a set of theories commonly referred to now as classical decision-making theories were accepted by most decision researchers. Briefly, these theories tended to be prescriptive in nature, suggesting that decision makers should use a rational approach to decision making (see Klein, Orasanu, Calderwood, & Zsambok, 1993) . However, in the mid-to late 198Os, a trend toward more "naturalistic" views of decision making began gaining popularity. According to Orasanu and Connolly (1993) this was because it was "not feasible to apply classical decision-making research analyses to many real-life situations" (p. 19) because they do not account for the expertise of the decision maker. Moreover, these authors and others (e.g., Brehmer, 1990) have argued that it is impossible to isolate decision making and study it apart from the task in which it resides. Hence, the naturalistic decision making movement can be broadly characterized as one involving the study of real-world task performance and action in which decisions happen to be embedded (for more explanation see Cannon-Bowers, Salas, & Pruitt, 1996; Cohen, 1993; Zsambok & Klein, 1997) . It suggests that to conduct meaningful research, study participants, experimental tasks, and other details must be selected or constructed carefully to resemble closely how performance occurs in the real world.
Recognition-Primed Decision Making
One major theoretical approach to decision making that falls under the general heading of naturalistic decision making is recognition-primed decision making (RPD; see Klein, 1989) . According to this theory, people interpret a situation in which they find themselves by comparing it with similar, previously experienced situations. When confronting a new situation, they use their memory of the old situation to create a tentative representation for the new situation. This representation accounts for the observed situation data, creates expectations about activities that should be observed in the future, and specifies constraints about the characteristics of the situation that may not be observed. The situation representation is continually tested with new data. Data that are consistent with expectations confirm the representation for predicting future events and for inferring characteristics about the event that may not have been observed. Disconfirming data can either refine the representation or indicate that it must be replaced altogether, but there is evidence that sometimes it is ignored or explained away.
In general, the naturalistic decision making family of theories has had a significant impact on TADMUS research. First of all, in general we decided at the outset of the program to conduct field investigations with actual Navy participants whenever possible. This was because we believed that our ability to generalize the results of our efforts to actual operators would be hurt drastically if we relied on laboratory tasks.
Second, naturalistic decision making suggests that expertise develops over time on the basis of the decision makers' experiences. As such, we concluded early on that the goal of decision-making training should be to accelerate the development of expertise (see Cannon-Bowers & Bell, 1997). According to Cannon-Bowers and Bell (1997) one way t o accomplish this is through use of practice-based interventions such as simulation and training that is embedded into the task environment. Therefore, we adopted an event-based approach to training (Dwyer, Fowlkes, Oser, Salas, & Lane, 1997 ) that allowed us to craft scenarios from a set of events. These events are tied to training objectives and provide a basis for feedback. Over time, this process of providing "managed experiencesn with appropriate performance feedback should lead decision makers to have knowledge structures and mental models necessary to confront novel situations.
Finally, the RPD theory itself has important implications as a basis on which to design training and decision support. 
A Brief History of Team Performance and Effectiveness Research
In the mid-to late 1980s, researchers in the team area were concerned with several factors. First, a body of research on how teams evolve over time (e.g., Glickman et al., 1987; Morgan, Glickman, Woodard, Blaiwes, & Salas, 1986 ) was being developed. Briefly, this line of work sought to determine the phases of development that characterized team performance. Several important conclusions can be drawn from this work. First, teams appear to develop two related tracks of skill-those associated with the technical aspects of the task (labeled taskwork) and those associated with the team aspects of the task (labeled teamwork; see Morgan et al., 1986 ). In addition, it was found that teamwork skills are consistent across tasks and that they are related to the team's effectiveness (McIntyre & Salas, 1995) . In the early 1990s researchers turned their attention toward developing models of team effectiveness (e.g., Hackman, 1990; Salas et al., 1992; Tannenbaum, Beard, & Salas, 1992) . These models generally attempted to relate characteristics both internal and external to the team with team effectiveness. For example, Tannenbaum et al. (1992) proposed an inputprocess -output model that included individual characteristics, team characteristics, task characteristics, and work structure as influences on team processes and outcomes. For a more complete description of this model see Tannenbaum et al., Salas et al. (1992) , and Salas, Cannon-Bowers, and Johnston (1997).
Another trend in the 1990s was to begin specification of the knowledge, skills, and attitudes required for effective team performance. Early work in this area suggested that seven dimensions of team behavior seemed to best describe expert team performance. These include: mission analysis, assertiveness, adaptability/flexibility, situational awareness, decision making, leadership, and communication (see Prince, Brannick, Prince, & Salas, 1992; Prince & Salas, 1993) . This work was an important beginning in determining the content of team training.
Subsequent effort in this area led Cannon-Bowers and her colleagues to propose that teams require several categories of competencies (i.e., knowledge, skills, and attitudes) to be effective (Cannon-Bowers, Tannenbaum, Salas, & Volpe, 1995) . Briefly, these authors maintained that team competencies may be either generic or specific to the task, or generic or specific to the team. Combining these categories yields four classes of competencies required for teams-generic (i.e., those that apply across tasks and teams), task contingent (i.e., those that are specific to the task at hand but that apply across teams), team contingent (i-e., those that are specific to the team but not to the task), and context driven (i.e., those that are specific to both the task and the team).
It is beyond the scope of this chapter to list all of the competencies included in the Cannon-Bowers et al. 
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The implications of these lines of inquiry for the development of TADMUS training interventions were vast. Essentially, these theoretical positions helped us to define the content of training-that is, which teamwork competencies needed to be trained. They also helped us to define the target of training by defining the characteristics of expert teams and team performance. In addition, they had an impact on the manner in which we developed performance measures in training (e.g., see Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 1997; Smith-Jentsch, Johnston, & Payne, chap. 4, this volume). Overall, the team performance and effectiveness literature provided a solid foundation on which to develop training interventions.
Shared Mental Model Theory
One of the important theories of team performance we relied on is shared mental model theory. The notion of mental models has been invoked as an explanatory mechanism by those studying skilled performance and system control for a number of years (Jagacinski & Miller, 1978; Rouse & Morris, 1986; Veldhuyzen & Stassen, 1977) . According to Rouse and Morris (19861, a mental model can be defined as a "mechanism whereby humans generate descriptions of system purpose and form, explanations of system functioning and observed system states, and predictions of future system states" (p. 360).
In the area of cognitive psychology, researchers have suggested that mental models are important more generally to the understanding of how humans interact and cope with the world (Rouse & Morris, 1986) . For example, Williams, Hollan, and Stevens (1983) maintain that mental models allow people to predict and explain system behavior, and help them to understand the relationship between system components and events. Wickens (1984) contended further that mental models provide a source of people's expectations. In an even more general view, Johnson-Laird (1983) suggested that people "understand the world by constructing working models of it in their mind" (p. 10). Mental models enable people to draw inferences and make predictions, to understand phenomena, to decide what actions to take, to control system execution, and to experience events vicariously (Johnson-Laird, 1983) .
In reviewing the literature pertaining t o mental models, Rouse and Morris (1986) concluded that a number of common themes can be drawn among theories that describe the purpose of mental models; namely that mental models serve to help people describe, explain, and predict system behavior. It must also be noted that most theorists conceptualize mental models as more than simple mental images. Instead, mental models are manipulable, enabling people t o predict system states by mental manipulation of model parameters (see Johnson-Laird, 1983 , for a detailed description of mental model functioning). Klein (1978) suggested, for example, that expert decision makers engage in a mental simulation that allows them to predict the ramifications of a potential decision before taking action.
With respect to training, a number of theorists have hypothesized that training that fosters development of accurate mental models of a system will improve performance. According to Rouse and Morris (1986) , for example, one of the purposes of instruction is to develop mental models necessary to execute the task. Recent evidence suggests that the manner in which people cognitively structure information about a task has an impact on the way new information is assimilated and learned (cf. Eberts & Brock, 1987) . Information that is compatible with existing mental models will be easier to learn (Wickens, 1984) . Preexisting models of the task can also have an impact on training. Rouse and Morris (1986) contend in this regard that incorrect mental models can impede learning. Furthermore, evidence suggests that preexisting models may be difficult to eliminate; they appear to persist in the face of correct information (e.g., DiSessa, 1982) . Finally, evidence suggests that to be most effective and generalizable, training must provide a conceptual model of the system, along with specific guidance or cueing in how general principles of system functioning are applied (Rouse & Morris, 1986) .
Team Performance and Shared Mental Models
Research into team effectiveness has shown that effective teams can maintain performance even under conditions of high workload when communication opportunities are reduced (Kleinman & Serfaty, 1989) . This ability has been labeled implicit coordination-it depends on the team's ability to draw on a common understanding of the task. Recently, several authors have hypothesized that the mechanisms that allow this type of performance are shared mental models (Cannon-Bowers, Salas, & Converse, 1993; Rouse, Cannon-Bowers, & Salas, 1992) . Shared mental models allow team members to predict the needs of the task and anticipate the actions of other team members in order to adjust their behavior accordingly. In other words, team members appear to form expectations of what is likely to happen. Particularly when a novel situation arises, teams that cannot strategize overtly must exercise shared or common models of the task and team to maintain performance (Cannon-Bowers et al., 1993; Kleinman & Serfaty, 1989; McIntyre, Morgan, Salas, & Glickman, 1988; Orasanu, 1990) . The role of mental models in explaining team behavior, then, stems from their ability to allow team members to generate predictions about task and team demands in absence of communication among team members (Cannon-Bowers et al., 1993) .
The notion of shared mental models and how they relate to team effectiveness presented thus far has several implications for the understanding of team performance and training. As an explanatory mechanism, the team mental model construct is useful in understanding how teams are able to coordinate behavior and select task strategies in absence of explicit coordination activities. Under conditions of high workload, time pressure, and other kinds of stress, such implicit coordination appears to be critical (Kleinman & Serfaty, 1989) .
With respect to training, the shared mental model idea suggests that training strategies designed to foster development of shared mental models has the potential to improve team performance. Such interventions must have as a goal the development in the trainees of a shared knowledge of the task and its demands, of the role of each team member in relation to all others, and of the characteristics of each of the other members of the team. Moreover, training for shared mental models must allow team members to build common models of the task and to develop and maintain accurate shared situation assessment.
Other Theoretical Perspectives
As noted, several other theoretical perspectives influenced TADMUS research. These are detailed next.
Automaticity
The theory of controlled versus automatic processing (see Fisk, Ackerman, & Schneider, 1987; Shriffin & Schneider, 1977) provides a basis on which to hypothesize that overtraining may be a viable means to help individuals be more resilient to stress effects. The theory postulates that certain task components can be "automatized"; that is, performed with little demand on cognitive resources. Automatized skills can be performed rapidly and effortlessly even under extremely exceptional conditions such as stress (Kirlik, Fisk, Walker, & Rothrock, chap. 5 , this volume). The implication of this research for tactical decision making training is that it may be possible to train certain components of the decision-making task to automaticity free up critical resources for higher order cognitive functioning (Hodge et al., 1995) . This is particularly critical in stressful or emergent situations. In terms of training system design, this research can lead to principles for overtraining decision makers, and for part-task training (i.e., training only selected aspects of the larger task).
Goal Orientation
Another theoretical perspective that has relevance to the training of tactical decision-making skills has to do with goal orientation in training (Kozlowski, chap. 6, this volume). Briefly, this is an intervention that can be implemented prior to practice sessions that focuses trainees' attention on their own mastery of the task rather than on their performance outcomes in training. According to Kozlowski (chap. 6, this voulme), a "mastery orientation'' causes trainees to focus their attention on how well they are learning the task. As such, it helps to trigger meta-cognitive strategies in training (i.e., whereby trainees attend to their progress and learning state), which helps them to place emphasis on those aspects of the task that they may not understand or believe they have mastered. Mastery orientations also help to build self-efficacy-they focus the trainee's attention on successes so as to increase confidence. In contrast, a "performance" orientation places emphasis on how well the trainee is performing during training, stressing the performance outcome rather than the learning process.
In terms of training design, goal orientation has the potential t o provide a relatively simple, low-cost mechanism to improve training effectiveness. In addition, because goal orientation drives trainees to consider different aspects of the task more deeply, it can also be expected that longterm retention and transfer will be enhanced.
Meta-Cognition
In conjunction with the naturalistic decision making movement, a number of researchers have argued that meta-cognitive skills can be crucial in stressful decision-making situations. It should be noted that in this case we are referring to meta-cognition during actual task performance, rather than meta-cognition during the learning process as discussed earlier. In terms of task performance, it has been argued that well-developed metacognitive skills can help decision makers assess the amount of time they have to make a decision, to avoid decision biases, and to reduce errors (Cohen, Freeman, & Wolf, 1996) .
In terms of training, this line of thinking implies that training operators in task-specific meta-cognitive skills will improve performance. These skills involve the ability of the decision maker to assess his or her own decision-making process as the problem unfolds. In terms of the design of such training, it would seem that some type of scenario-based practice strategy could provide a vehicle to demonstrate and reinforce desired behaviors.
Stress Inoculation
As mentioned above, several researchers have suggested that exposing people to stress in training may inoculate them from the effects of stress in task performance (Ivancevich, Matteson, Freedman, & Phillips, 1990; Novaco, Cook, & Sarason, 1983; Zakay & Wooler, 1984) . Although much of the research in this area has been conducted in clinical settings, it is clear that it had implications for task training. In fact, over the years, stress inoculation training has grown in popularity (Gebhardt & Crump, 1990) . In fact, several cognitive-behavioral stress-coping training programs have been shown to be effective Meichenbaum, 1985; Smith, 1980) .
According to Johnston and Cannon-Bowers (19961, stress exposure training (SET) refers to stress-coping training that extends beyond the clinical psychology domain. Further, SET has three objectives: to build skills that promote effective performance under stress, to build task-specific confidence or self-efficacy, and to enhance familiarity with the stress environment . It rests on the notion that when people have accurate expectations regarding what to expect in the stress environment, have confidence in their ability to cope with such stressors, and have an opportunity to practice dealing with the stress so that appropriate skills can be developed, maximal performance can be expected.
The implications of this position for developing training are outlined in Johnston and Cannon-Bowers (1996) . Briefly, they delineate a threephased approach including (a) presentation of requisite knowledge regarding typical stress reactions, (b) practice building meta-cognitive skills and problem-solving skills, and (c) practice while being exposed to the actual stressors. Taken together, these activities should prepare trainees t o cope with difficult environmental and task demands.
Hypotheses for Training
At this point it is possible to summarize the major hypotheses for training that we derived for empirical consideration. Table 1 provides an overview of the theoretical perspectives we considered under TADMUS along with the training interventions that flowed from them. Because the remaining chapters of this volume (as well as other work-see Appendix B at the end of this volume) describes these in detail and documents their effectiveness, we do not repeat them here. Instead, we briefly review each of these as they relate to the underlying theory or perspective.
In Table 1 , the first column lists the theoretical perspective that we drew from. The second column provides a hypothesis for training that was generated from this perspective. The third column shows the training intervention that we developed on the basis of the hypothesis. The fourth column lists references pertinent to the training intervention (either theoretical or empirical). In the following sections we explain briefly the information in the table, organized by the training intervention; many of these are covered in more detail in other chapters.
1.
Event-based training. This approach seeks to provide a systematic mechanism to insert crucial events into training scenarios. It is consistent with the naturalistic decision making perspective in that it allows scenario-based training to be structured in a manner that accelerates the development of expertise. 
3.

4.
5. Extracting and training consistent aspects of the task will free up resources for more difficult aspects of the problem. Helping trainees to be aware of their decision-making process during performance will improve decision-making performance.
Helping trainees to focus their attention on their own learning will improve their confidence and performance. Exposing trainees to the stressors likely to confront them and training coping skills will improve performance.
Self-correction training
Part-task training Meta-cognitive training Part-task training. Consistent with theory of automaticity, a part-task training intervention was developed and tested. The notion here is that the consistent aspect of the task can be isolated and trained so that it does not require cognitive resources during task performance (ie., because these resources are better applied to higher order aspects of the problem). For more detail, see Kirlik, Fisk, Walker, and Rothrock (chap. 5, this volume) . Meta-cognitive training. An intervention based on meta-cognition was developed. This intervention was designed to train decision makers to use meta-cognitive strategies as a means to cope with difficult decision-making situations (see Cohen, Freeman, & Thompson, chap. 7 , for a description of the intervention). Mastery learning. Consistent with the notion of goal orientation in training, an intervention was developed that uses a mastery learning orientation. "he idea here is to focus the trainees' attention on their own state of learning. Kozlowski (chap. 6, this volume) provides more detail on this intervention. Stress exposure training. Given what was said about stress exposure training, this intervention seeks to implement and test the three-phased approach described earlier. (For more detail on this intervention, see Johnston and Cannon-Bowers, 1996 ; Driskell and Johnston, chap. 8, this volume).
7.
8.
9.
10.
Summary and Conclusion
Our purpose in this chapter was to provide background information regarding the theoretical underpinnings of TADMUS. As noted, we attempted to cope with the problem of choosing training interventions to test (and predicting which would be most effective) by adopting and elaborating a set of theoretical perspectives regarding performance in the types of tasks we were interested in. Of course, there are probably many other training interventions that may have be effective-no single research program can exhaust all possibilities. However, we are confident that in adopting this theoretically based approach we were able to develop and test several meaningful and fruitful training solutions. The remainder of the chapters elaborate the major findings of the effort.
